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REFLECTIONS ON THE ANNIVERSARIES
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I. INTRODUCTION
THE United States Supreme Court’s decision in Cruzan v. Director,Missouri Department of Health marks its thirtieth anniversary in2020.1 This follows closely after the fiftieth anniversary of the
Apollo 11 moon landing.2 Anniversaries provide an opportunity for re-
flection and to gain perspective. We can, I suggest, gain deeper insights
regarding human life and death by considering these two anniversaries
together. Apollo 11 may seem far from Nancy Cruzan—but the discovery
of disturbing details about the death of Neil Armstrong, the first man on
the moon, is a productive introduction to the topic of death in a modern
American health care institution. Both anniversaries focus on individu-
als—Nancy Cruzan (the second woman, after Karen Ann Quinlan, to
personify the American “right to die”) and Neil Armstrong (the first man
on the moon). The stories of both Nancy Cruzan and Neil Armstrong are
also tied to massive built environments: the American health care nonsys-
tem and its hospitals and complex medical procedures, and the Apollo
spacecraft and its rockets and bewildering computers. These technologies
have not just changed what we can do, they have changed the way we
think about ourselves and our future. This article unfolds in four parts:
* William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor and Director of the Center for
Health Law, Ethics & Human Rights at the Boston University School of Public Health,
School of Medicine, and School of Law.
1. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
2. Peter Baker, For 50 Years Since Apollo 11, Presidents Have Tried to Take That
Next Giant Leap, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/19/us/polit-
ics/apollo-11-anniversary-presidents.html [https://perma.cc/T9EP-RQB8].
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the death of Neil Armstrong; the death of Nancy Cruzan; Cruzan’s prog-
eny and physician-assisted suicide; and our failure to protect the rights of
competent hunger-striking prisoners to refuse fluids and nutrition by la-
beling hunger striking as a suicidal act.
II. THE DEATH OF NEIL ARMSTRONG
The success of the Apollo 11 moon landing immediately made the pro-
ject the most celebrated engineering feat in human history and the first
man on the moon, Neil Armstrong, the most famous person in the world.
It was such an astonishing accomplishment that it is routinely used to
suggest that if America can put a man on the moon, it should be able to
solve a host of other challenging problems, including going to Mars, cur-
ing cancer, reversing climate change, or even vastly extending human lon-
gevity.3 The fascination with technology on which the moon landing was
built finds its most endearing appeal in medicine, especially medical inno-
vations that can “save lives.”
Space travel can, of course, be dangerous, and all the Apollo astronauts
recognized that they were putting their lives at risk every time they
boarded a space capsule.4 Less well recognized is that hospital care is also
dangerous. Estimates of avoidable deaths in American hospitals, 300,000
or more deaths a year, make it the third largest cause of death in the
United States after heart disease and cancer.5 After three astronauts were
incinerated in a fire inside an Apollo capsule while it was on the ground,
investigators concluded that NASA did not have a culture of safety but
rather one that tolerated unnecessary risks.6 The same can, unfortunately,
still be said of American medicine. Nonetheless, it was horrifying to learn
from the New York Times in July 2019 that Neil Armstrong died not of
“natural causes” but as a result of likely medical malpractice in the treat-
ment of his heart disease.7
Even the most famous person in the world is at risk of a fatal error
during hospitalization in America. And, of course, no matter one’s fame,
death is certain, and relatives may have to make a decision about termi-
nating treatment. Armstrong’s avoidable death in a hospital brings
Apollo 11 back down to earth and suggests that, as we seek immortality
3. See, e.g., Charles Fishman, The Wild, Improbable History of the Phrase ‘If We Can
Put a Man on the Moon . . .’, FAST CO. (June 24, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/
90366583/the-wild-improbable-history-of-the-phrase-if-we-can-put-a-man-on-the-moon
[https://perma.cc/4U2X-RYNQ].
4. See Elizabeth Howell, Apollo 11 Moon Landing Carried Big Risks for Astronauts,
NASA, SPACE.COM (July 19, 2014), https://www.space.com/26576-apollo-11-moon-landing-
risks.html [https://perma.cc/D77Y-NZ6P].
5. Martin A. Makary & Michael Daniel, Medical Error—the Third Leading Cause of
Death in the US, BMJ (May 3, 2016), https://www.bmj.com/content/353/bmj.i2139 [https://
perma.cc/2UT7-DWHA].
6. Kevin Fong, Moon Landing: Space Medicine and the Legacy of Project Apollo, 394
LANCET 205, 207 (2019).
7. Scott Shane & Sarah Kliff, Neil Armstrong’s Death, and a Stormy, Secret $6 Million
Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/23/us/neil-arm-
strong-wrongful-death-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/D5X6-34F3].
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in the stars, we remain grounded in death here on earth. Based on medi-
cal records made available to the New York Times, Armstrong went to
the hospital with chest pain and underwent successful cardiac bypass sur-
gery, after which he was up and walking.8 Some experts questioned
whether the surgery should have been done at all.9 He was doing fine
until a nurse removed the wires in his heart connected to a temporary
pacemaker, which caused “significant and rapid bleeding.”10 Armstrong
was rushed to the cardiac catheterization lab, but the bleeding could not
be stopped.11 He was then taken to an operating room for surgery but
never regained consciousness.12 In retrospect, a cardiac surgeon and an
operating room should have been on standby when the pacemaker wires
were removed, and he should have been brought to an operating room
immediately. Taking him to a cardiac catheter lab was simply a mistake
that fatally delayed proper care.13 In the words of an expert hired by the
family, Joseph Bavaria, vice-chair of cardiothoracic surgery at the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania, “The decision to go to the catheter lab was THE
major error.”14 One likely explanation for the substandard care is that the
hospital in which he was treated, Fairfield Hospital (now called Bon Se-
cours Mercy Health), was a community hospital that did a low volume of
cardiac surgeries.15 Low volume made it a poor choice for cardiac sur-
gery, especially since it is in the same city as Cincinnati Medical Center, a
major medical center with much higher volume that made it a much more
justifiable choice.16 Armstrong never regained consciousness. He was re-
moved from life support a week later.17 He was eighty-two.18
I have previously suggested that our inability to repair our broken
health care nonsystem can be traced to four fundamental characteristics
of American society. We are individualistic, technologically driven, death-
denying, and wasteful.19 Of these four, death denial affects us the most.
Death is the central reality of human life—but it is one we continually
refuse to face. Rather, we try to give responsibility for death to physicians
and lawyers. Yet this will never succeed, since death is neither a medical
nor a legal problem; although, depending on where it occurs—in a space
capsule or in a community hospital—it can produce significant medical
8. Id.
9. Gina Kolata, Neil Armstrong Died After Heart Surgery. That May Have Been
Avoidable, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/25/health/neil-
armstrong-heart-surgery.html [https://perma.cc/Y6KL-NBVA].
10. Shane & Kliff, supra note 7.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.; Kolata, supra note 9.
14. Shane & Kliff, supra note 7.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See id.; see also Scott Shane, Sarah Kliff & Susanne Craig, ‘Would Dad Approve?’
Neil Armstrong’s Heirs Divide Over a Lucrative Legacy, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/07/27/us/neil-armstrong-heirs.html [https://perma.cc/6VP6-DDBZ].
18. Shane & Kliff, supra note 7.
19. GEORGE J. ANNAS, WORST CASE BIOETHICS: DEATH, DISASTER, AND PUBLIC
HEALTH 11–14 (2010).
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and legal questions. The geography of death also determines what tech-
nologies will be available to try to prevent or postpone it.
American novelist Don DeLillo, perhaps America’s most critical ex-
plorer of the impact of technology on how we think about ourselves and
our futures, has suggested a future in which those who can afford it will
have their bodies frozen and put into storage.20 The idea is that a frozen
body can be reawakened when technology has advanced to a point where
it can be revived to go on living in some form.21 Of course, the broad
outlines of his plot are suggested by the commercial frozen body reposi-
tory, Alcor, which offers to freeze your body after death with the hope of
resurrection.22 Why immortality through cryopreservation? A sales rep
for DeLillo’s fictional company suggests a checklist of questions to con-
sider when making a decision to freeze (or not freeze) your body for a
type of immortality:
Once we master life extension . . . what happens to our energies, our
aspirations?
. . .
Are we designing a future culture of lethargy and self-indulgence?
. . .
Isn’t it sufficient to live a little longer through advanced technology?
Do we need to go on and on and on?
. . .
Won’t we become a planet of the old and stooped, tens of billions
with toothless grins?23
Later, DeLillo imagines a dialogue that might go on in the “mind” of a
female frozen client:
Is this the nightmare of self drawn so tight that she is trapped
forever.
I try to know who I am
But all I am is what I am saying and this is nearly nothing.
She is not able to see herself, give herself a name, estimate the time
since she began to think what she is thinking.
I think I am someone. But I am only saying words.
The words never go away.24
Neal Stephenson also imagines reading the mind of a frozen person in
his 2019 novel Fall.25 What little can take place in a frozen brain forces us
to ask whether we really want what we say we want. Is “living” on in an
extremely minimalist way or living virtually as part of a computer-ena-
bled Matrix-style program (“But all I am is what I am saying and this is
20. DON DELILLO, ZERO K (2016) (a novel about a search for immortality through
cryopreservation).
21. What Is Cryonics?, ALCOR LIFE EXTENSION FOUND., https://alcor.org/AboutCry-
onics/index.html [https://perma.cc/K483-BC4E] (last visited Dec. 18, 2019).
22. See id.
23. DELILLO, supra note 20, at 69.
24. Id. at 161.
25. NEAL STEPHENSON, FALL; OR, DODGE IN HELL (2019) (a novel exploring the digi-
tal preservation and reawakening of a human brain).
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nearly nothing”26) worth it—or is it in the category of a fate worse than
death? How does it compare to Karen Ann Quinlan or Nancy Cruzan’s
lives in a permanent vegetative state? How minimal should minimal con-
scious be to qualify as a life worth preserving?27 Or rather than interro-
gating quality of life, should we take the position of the state of Missouri
in Cruzan that government can claim an unqualified interest in the lives
of its citizens?28
DeLillo’s characters have come a long way since his novel White Noise
in which one character suggests that if you are worried about death you
can deny it, put your faith in religion, or “[y]ou could put your faith in
technology. It got you here, it can get you out. This is the whole point of
technology. It creates an appetite for immortality on the one hand. It
threatens universal extinction on the other.”29 As the late bioethicist
Daniel Callahan has noted, space travel and medical technology both face
unlimited frontiers: no matter how far you go in space or how far you go
with medical technology, you can always go further.30 Private commercial
ventures, fueled by the profit motive, now dominate both space travel
and medicine. In filing a lawsuit on behalf of Armstrong’s family against
the hospital in which he died, the Armstrong family lawyer, Bertha Hel-
mick, made the commercial point in the context of branding: “Any
linkage of this health provider to the death [of Neil Armstrong] could
irreparably and unfairly forever taint the business enterprise. . . . No insti-
tution wants to be remotely associated with the death of one of America’s
greatest heroes.”31 The prospect of spectacularly negative publicity was
why the hospital insisted that the settlement (totaling $6 million) be con-
fidential.32 The business model of most American hospitals calls for rou-
tinely covering up medical malpractice rather than facing and correcting
it.
As private hospitals and health insurance companies discover new ways
to make money, we should expect to see parallel commercial develop-
ments in the space sector. Writer Kenneth Chang, for example, has sug-
gested, under the category of using the moon as a business opportunity,
that “[t]here could be an opening for companies that would ship the ashes
of loved ones to the moon as a memorial.”33 If we can go to the moon,
shouldn’t we be able to provide everyone a “right to die”? Or is the prob-
26. DELILLO, supra note 20, at 161.
27. See, e.g., Joseph J. Fins, When No One Notices: Disorders of Consciousness and the
Chronic Vegetative State, HASTINGS CTR. REP., July–Aug. 2019, at 14, 14.
28. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 262–63 (1990).
29. DON DELILLO, WHITE NOISE 285 (1985) (a novel about the side effects of modern
technology).
30. DANIEL CALLAHAN, TAMING THE BELOVED BEAST 9 (2009).
31. Shane & Kliff, supra note 7.
32. Id.
33. Kenneth Chang, Why Everyone Wants to Go Back to the Moon, N.Y. TIMES (July
12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/12/science/nasa-moon-apollo-artemis.html
[https://perma.cc/A87N-SLVW]. See generally WALTER MCDOUGALL, THE HEAVENS AND
THE EARTH: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SPACE AGE (1985).
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lem of death one we will never be able to confront, at least in the context
of the great American health care nonsystem?
III. THE DEATH OF NANCY CRUZAN
Nancy Cruzan’s name is known primarily because her death was the
subject of the major, and deeply flawed, Supreme Court opinion on in-
formed consent and its corollary, the right to refuse treatment.34 Prior to
Cruzan, the most well-known right to refuse treatment case was the 1976
New Jersey case of Karen Ann Quinlan, a young woman in exactly the
same physical condition (persistent vegetative state) as Cruzan, except—
it was believed—Quinlan needed both a feeding tube and a ventilator to
continue to survive.35 Quinlan’s case provoked widespread public agree-
ment with the wishes of her parents to have her removed from her venti-
lator so she could die.36 This was because all believed she would never
regain consciousness, and most Americans are terrified of being kept
alive in a permanent vegetative state by machines.37 Because she was the
first to raise the “right to die” as a national issue, Quinlan will always be
the most famous personification of it. Cruzan will always be, like Buzz
Aldrin,38 second. Nonetheless, Cruzan was the first to get her case to the
Supreme Court.
Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote the opinion of the Court in
Cruzan, which was split five to four, mischaracterizing it confusingly as a
right to die and a right to cause death case.39 Without deciding the issue,
the Chief Justice wrote that, “[f]or purposes of this case,” the Court
would assume that the U.S. Constitution would grant “a competent per-
son a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and
nutrition.”40 Such a right was seen as implicit in previous decisions, based
on the liberty interest in the Fourteenth Amendment.41 The core of the
case, however, was determining whether the State could restrict the exer-
cise of the right to refuse treatment by a surrogate decision maker acting
on behalf of a previously competent patient.42 The question was whether
the Constitution forbids a state from requiring clear and convincing evi-
dence of a person’s expressed decision while competent to have hydra-
tion and nutrition withdrawn in such a way as to cause death.43 The Court
34. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
35. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 655 (N.J. 1976).
36. See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 267–68.
37. Id. See generally NORMAN L. CANTOR, LEGAL FRONTIERS OF DEATH AND DYING
(1987).
38. Buzz Aldrin was a member of the three-person Apollo 11 crew and was the second
man to walk on the moon. See Baker, supra note 2. See generally GENE FARMER & DORA
JANE HAMBLIN, FIRST ON THE MOON: A VOYAGE WITH NEIL ARMSTRONG, MICHAEL
COLLINS, EDWIN E. ALDRIN, JR. (1970).
39. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 262, 277.
40. Id. at 279.
41. Id. at 278–79.
42. Id. at 280.
43. Id.
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concluded that the Constitution did not prohibit this procedural
requirement.44
Four basic reasons were given for this conclusion. The first reason was
that this evidentiary standard (clear and convincing evidence) promotes
the State’s legitimate interest “in the protection and preservation of
human life.”45 The second reason was that “the choice between life and
death is a deeply personal decision . . . .”46 The third reason was that
abuses can occur if no “loved ones [are] available to serve as surrogate
decision makers.”47 Finally, the fourth reason was that the State may
properly “simply assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of
human life . . . .”48
The Court also thought that use of the clear-and-convincing standard
was appropriate because it was better to err on the side of continuing
treatment, noting that “[a]n erroneous decision not to terminate results in
a maintenance of the status quo[ ] [and] the possibility of subsequent de-
velopments such as advancements in medical science, . . . [while an] erro-
neous decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment . . . is not susceptible
of correction.”49
Justice William Brennan, writing for three of the four dissenting Jus-
tices, persuasively outlined the majority opinion’s shortcomings.50 He ar-
gued that the right to refuse treatment is a fundamental constitutional
right and cannot be restricted unless the state can demonstrate a compel-
ling interest—something more than just a general interest in life.51 Even
if a rational basis test was adopted, Brennan argued the State could not
meet even this low bar because its rule could result in more deaths by
discouraging trials of therapy, by making them too difficult to end when
they are not successful.52 Justice Brennan argued that the only legitimate
interest the State had was in ascertaining the patient’s wishes.53 Because
the clear-and-convincing standard excludes considerable evidence that
could help the decision maker determine the patient’s wishes, application
of this high evidentiary standard effectively “transform[ed] [incompetent]
human beings into passive subjects of medical technology.”54
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor used her concurring opinion to discuss
surrogate decision makers and encouraged everyone to appoint a proxy
decision maker.55 She emphasized that Cruzan “does not preclude a fu-
ture determination that the Constitution requires the States to implement
44. Id. at 286–87.
45. Id. at 280.
46. Id. at 281
47. Id.
48. Id. at 282.
49. Id. at 283.
50. Id. at 301–30 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 305.
52. Id. at 314.
53. Id. at 317–19.
54. Id. at 325.
55. See id. at 287–92 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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the decisions of a duly appointed surrogate.”56 This is reasonable advice,
but even if we all had health care proxies, this would not solve our
problems with death or the use of medical technology to postpone it.
Moreover, given that every indication is that Cruzan would have chosen
either her mother or father to speak on her behalf, it is an empty triumph
of procedure over substance to deny Cruzan’s parents the right to speak
on their daughter’s behalf.
In addition to Justice Brennan’s listing of the major flaws in Cruzan,
there are other flaws that I noted at the time in an essay in the New
England Journal of Medicine written for physicians.57 The first one is bla-
tantly obvious: physicians are not even mentioned in the opinion and are
called simply “hospital employees” with no role and no specific doctor-
patient relationship or medical obligations to the patient.58 No attention
is paid at all to medical reality or how decisions are actually made in
health care institutions. The second, and most important point, is that
“the Cruzan opinion [did] not change the law in any state or in any way
alter what physicians could or could not do before the opinion.”59 I did,
however, suggest that if states wanted to review their evidentiary rules
they should recognize that most families can and should be permitted to
make medical decisions for their incompetent family members.60 Moreo-
ver, the burden should be on the state to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the family’s wishes are inconsistent with the wishes of the
patient before removing decision-making authority from the family.61 I
also suggested that it would be prudent to adopt the type of health care
proxy arguably endorsed by Justice O’Connor,62 a step taken by Massa-
chusetts almost immediately after the opinion was published.63
On the thirtieth anniversary of Cruzan, it seems reasonable to conclude
that its most significant legacy is the physician-assisted suicide cases that
followed it, which, like Cruzan, Chief Justice Rehnquist assigned to him-
self.64 In a striking contrast to Cruzan, both of these opinions were
unanimous.65
56. Id. at 292.
57. George J. Annas, Nancy Cruzan and the Right to Die, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 670,
672 (1990) [hereinafter Annas, Nancy Cruzan and the Right to Die].
58. Id.
59. Id. This point was also made by a group of bioethicists who were meeting at a
national conference when the Cruzan opinion was issued. George J. Annas et al.,
Bioethicists’ Statement on the U.S. Supreme Court’s Cruzan Decision, 323 NEW ENG. J.
MED 686, 686 (1990).
60. Annas, Nancy Cruzan and the Right to Die, supra note 57, at 672.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 201D, § 4 (2019). A form that satisfies the provisions of this
law is available online from the Massachusetts Medical Society. Health Care Proxies and
End of Life Care, MASS. MED. SOC’Y, http://www.massmed.org/Patient-Care/Health-Top
ics/Health-Care-Proxies-and-End-of-Life-Care/Health-Care-Proxies-and-End-of-Life-Care
/#.XfpUlGRKg2w [https://perma.cc/E7WG-AEWT] (last visited Dec. 18, 2019).
64. See infra Part IV (discussing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), and
Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997)).
65. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702; Quill, 521 U.S. 793.
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IV. CRUZAN’S PROGENY
Risking death in space travel is not suicide, or even risking suicide; it is
selecting and pursuing a risky profession. Nonetheless, astronauts, like all
of us, can commit suicide, and suicide was acknowledged as a concern by
the third member of the Apollo crew, Michael Collins. As Armstrong and
Aldrin were walking on the moon, Collins was orbiting the moon in the
mother ship and contemplating what he would do should Armstrong and
Aldrin not return from the surface of the moon.66 Collins, as he de-
scribed, decided he would not commit suicide.67 In his words, “If they fail
to rise from the surface, or crash back into it, I am not going to commit
suicide . . . [and] I will be a marked man for life, and I know it.”68 Collins
provokes us mostly to deny that the moon landing had anything to do
with suicide. Similarly, the Supreme Court ultimately ruled in the two
physician-assisted suicide cases following Cruzan that refusal of medical
treatment has nothing to do with suicide.69
By ceding constitutional authority over life and death decisions to the
individual states in Cruzan, the Court set the stage for decades of state
legislative activity in the area of physician-assisted suicide and for two
additional Court decisions. Although I believe it was wrong and counter-
productive for the Court to ignore physicians altogether in Cruzan, I also
think the subsequent post-Cruzan, post-Quinlan obsession with granting
legal immunity to physicians for specific end-of-life actions is equally mis-
placed. Neither increasing state power over physicians nor increasing
physician power over patients will help us confront death.
After Cruzan, right-to-die proponents on both coasts adopted a Roe v.
Wade-type strategy70 to promote a new constitutional right: the “right to
physician-assisted suicide.” Two complimentary arguments made it to the
Supreme Court and were consolidated there: Washington v. Glucksberg71
and Vacco v. Quill.72 In Glucksberg, it was argued that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment contained a substantive constitu-
tional right to access to physician-prescribed drugs that could be used by
66. See Stephen Witt, Apollo 11: Mission Out of Control, WIRED (June 24, 2019, 6:00
AM), https://www.wired.com/story/apollo-11-mission-out-of-control/ [https://perma.cc/
85NJ-RPCD].
67. See id. Norman Mailer also discusses suicide in contemplating what would happen
if the lunar module (Eagle) failed to make its return to the mother ship. NORMAN MAILER,
OF A FIRE ON THE MOON 373–75 (1970).
If that ascent engine had not worked—there were no suicide capsules on the
Eagle. They would not have needed them. When the frustration of being
trapped on the moon proved too great, they would only have had to open the
hatch, and remove their helmets. That could not have felt much worse than
being a drowning man.
Id. at 373–74.
68. Id.
69. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725–26; Quill, 521 U.S. at 807.
70. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing a right to privacy,
including a women’s qualified right to terminate her pregnancy).
71. 521 U.S. 702.
72. 521 U.S. 793.
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a terminally ill patient to commit suicide.73 In Quill, it was argued that it
was a denial of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause to
permit the withholding or withdrawal of treatment that could lead to
death, and not to permit access to physician-prescribed drugs that could
be used for suicide for patients who were not dependent on medical tech-
nology for survival.74
Unlike Cruzan, these two cases involved no live patients; instead, they
were based on physician affidavits in which physicians asserted that they
could not help their patients kill themselves because they were worried
about potential legal liability for so doing.75 As in Cruzan, Chief Justice
Rehnquist assigned himself the majority opinion in both cases.76 He used
the cases to clarify some of his language in Cruzan, which the proponents
of a new constitutional right argued supported their cause. In Glucksberg,
for example, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted the respondents’ contention
that, in the Cruzan holding, the Court
“acknowledged that competent, dying persons have the right to di-
rect the removal of life-sustaining medical treatment and thus hasten
death” and that “the constitutional principle behind recognizing the
patient’s liberty to direct the withdrawal of artificial life support ap-
plies at least as strongly to the choice to hasten impending death by
consuming legal medication.”77
The Chief Justice also quoted the conclusion of the court of appeals that
“Cruzan, by recognizing a liberty interest that includes the refusal of arti-
ficial provision of life-sustaining food and water, necessarily recognize[d]
a liberty interest in hastening one’s own death.”78 But Chief Justice
Rehnquist was summarizing these arguments only to reject them:
The right assumed in Cruzan, however, was not simply deduced from
abstract concepts of personal autonomy. Given the common-law rule
that forced medication was a battery, and the long tradition protect-
ing the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment, our assump-
tion was entirely consistent with this Nation’s history and
constitutional traditions. The decision to commit suicide with the as-
sistance of another may be just as personal and profound as the deci-
sion to refuse unwanted medical treatment, but it has never enjoyed
similar legal protection. Indeed, the two acts are widely and reasona-
bly regarded as quite distinct. In Cruzan itself, we recognized that
most States outlawed assisted suicide—and even more do today—
and we certainly gave no intimation that the right to refuse unwanted
medical treatment could be some-how transmuted into a right to as-
sistance in committing suicide.79
73. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723–24.
74. Quill, 521 U.S. at 798.
75. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705–08; Quill, 521 U.S. at 796–98.
76. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702; Quill, 521 U.S. 793.
77. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725 (internal citations omitted).
78. Id. (quoting Compassion in Dying v. State of Wash., 79 F.3d 790, 816 (9th Cir.
1996)).
79. Id. at 725–26 (internal citations omitted).
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In Quill, Chief Justice Rehnquist found the Equal Protection argument
even easier to dispose of. He noted first that “Cruzan . . . provides no
support for the notion that refusing life-sustaining medical treatment is
‘nothing more nor less than suicide.’”80 Therefore, he did not agree with
the respondents’ argument that “the distinction between refusing lifesav-
ing medical treatment and assisted suicide is ‘arbitrary’ and ‘irra-
tional.’”81 Rather, New York can constitutionally treat the refusal of life-
sustaining medical treatment and physician-assisted suicide differently. In
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s words, “By permitting everyone to refuse un-
wanted medical treatment while prohibiting anyone from assisting a sui-
cide, New York law follows a longstanding and rational distinction.”82
The Court’s two decisions kept the police power in the hands of the
states, suggesting that states could, among other things, enact new laws
that protected physicians from criminal and civil liability for assisting a
terminally ill patient to commit suicide. Oregon was the first such state to
do so, and over the years, a handful of states have joined Oregon, most
recently California.83
Constitutional lawyers had mixed reactions to the physician assisted-
suicide cases. Some insisted that the Court should have expanded the
right to privacy to include a peaceful death; others that the laws against
assisted suicide were properly endorsed. Erwin Chemerinsky, for exam-
ple, argued that the Court made a serious mistake—he believes that the
Constitution contains “a fundamental right to assisted death for termi-
nally ill patients,” and that prohibiting the exercise of that right could not
meet the compelling-government-interest standard.84 On the other hand,
no constitutional limits could be placed on citizens exercising this consti-
tutional right on the basis of their age, life expectancy, medical diagnosis,
or any other arbitrary characteristic. Moreover, although the Court ex-
plicitly approved of “terminal sedation” as a legitimate application of the
principle of the double effect,85 it failed to note that it can be simply good
medical practice to prescribe drugs for a legitimate medical purpose, such
as pain relief or sleeping pills, that patients could then use to kill them-
selves, as in the case of Timothy Quill and his patient, Diane.86
Chemerinsky began and ended his argument by referring to the death
of his father.87 His father was terminally ill with lung cancer and asked his
80. Quill, 521 U.S. at 807.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 808.
83. REBECCA A. ENGLISH ET AL., NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., PHYSI-
CIAN-ASSISTED DEATH: SCANNING THE LANDSCAPE: PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP
46–47 (2018).
84. Erwin Chemerinsky, Washington v. Glucksberg was Tragically Wrong, 106 MICH.
L. REV. 1501, 1502–03 (2008).
85. Quill, 521 U.S. at 807 n.11.
86. Timothy Quill, Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision Making, 324
NEW ENG. J. MED. 691, 693 (1991).
87. Chemerinsky, supra note 84, at 1501–02, 1516.
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physician to administer drugs to end his life.88 His father had, he be-
lieved, only a few days left to live and was in great pain and suffering.89
His father’s physician refused.90 Chemerinsky felt powerless to help but,
as he wrote, “[t]hankfully [his father] only lingered for a few days after
his request.”91 The practicalities of adopting a right to physician-assisted
suicide are highlighted in this case and should not be missed. All states
want to help prevent suicide and, therefore, want to prevent virtually all
suicides of people with more than six months to live. Moreover, so the
state can be sure of their intent, every state that permits the practice of
physician-assisted suicide requires a fourteen to fifteen day waiting pe-
riod.92 This means people in the position of Chemerinsky’s father, who
make a request with less than two weeks to live, would simply not qualify
for physician assistance, even in states that have enacted physician as-
sisted-suicide laws. This is one reason why only an extremely small num-
ber of patients have made use of physician-assisted suicide laws. For
example, even in Oregon where the law has existed the longest, in 2018,
fewer than 200 people died using lethal medications obtained under the
statute.93 This is hardly a “solution” to our problem with death. It is
worth noting that although all existing laws authorizing physician-assisted
suicide grant physicians legal immunity from criminal lawsuits,94 this is
mostly an imaginary problem in the minds of some physicians. As a mat-
ter of fact, no physician, other than the rogue pathologist Jack Kevorkian,
has ever been charged, let alone convicted, with physician-assisted suicide
for prescribing lethal drugs that a competent patient could use to end
their lives.95 We will have to look elsewhere for a solution for hard
deaths.
V. HUNGER STRIKES
Cruzan is probably best known by the slogan “right to die.” But it is
also celebrated as the case that put an end to the “fluids and nutrition”
debate, specifically whether these interventions are a form of comfort
care that must be routinely provided or whether they are a medical treat-
ment that can be refused. The Supreme Court had no trouble catego-
rizing them as medical treatment.96 It is legally permissible to stop
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) or any other medical intervention
88. Id. at 1501, 1516.
89. Id. at 1501.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1502.
92. David Orentlicher, Comparative Analysis of Legal Rules: Withdrawal of Treatment
Versus Physician-Assisted Death, in PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED DEATH: SCANNING THE LAND-
SCAPE: PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP 15, 17 (2018).
93. Oregon Death with Dignity Act: Annual Reports, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://
www.deathwithdignity.org/oregon-death-with-dignity-act-annual-reports/ [https://perma.cc/
9BUV-SCS4] (last visited Oct. 21, 2019).
94. Orentlicher, supra note 92. For an example, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-116(1)
(2016).
95. JACK KEVORKIAN, PRESCRIPTION: MEDICIDE 221–31 (1991).
96. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990).
2020] First Man and Second Woman 19
that is sustaining life, including mechanical ventilators, feeding tubes, IVs,
and dialysis.97 Moreover, none of these actions have ever constituted sui-
cide for the patient or assisted suicide for the physician: they are all rou-
tinely categorized as treatment refusals. Glucksburg and Quill simply
affirmed these conclusions from Cruzan.98 But one area remains vigor-
ously contested and is a fitting topic on which to end my anniversary re-
flections: hunger strikes by competent prisoners.
Hunger strikes generally occur in a prison setting, with one or more
prisoners refusing to eat (and sometimes drink) until the prisoners’ de-
mands (e.g., for freedom, better prison conditions, visitors, etc.) are
met.99 Prisoners have a constitutional right to refuse to eat or drink.100
The question is, Does the prison (the state) have a “compelling” interest
to force feed the prisoner, and if so, what constitutes the “least restric-
tive” or invasive method?
Hunger strikes were obviously not at issue in Cruzan; nonetheless,
some comments by the Justices in Cruzan are relevant to our discussion.
First, on the nature of force-feeding by nasogastric tube (the most com-
mon method used), Justice O’Connor notes in her concurring opinion:
Feeding a patient by means of a nasogastric tube requires a physician
to pass a long flexible tube through the patient’s nose, throat, and
esophagus and into the stomach. Because of the discomfort such a
tube causes, “many patients need to be restrained forcibly and their
hands put into large mittens to prevent them from removing the
tube.”101
Justice O’Connor later describes the extent of the bodily invasion in-
volved in force-feeding:
Requiring a competent adult to endure such procedures against her
will burdens the patient’s liberty, dignity, and freedom to determine
the course of her own treatment. Accordingly, the liberty guaranteed
97. A good example of the public’s understanding of this is the death of James A.
Michener, the author of Space, among many other best-selling books. See Stephanie Si-
mon, Blockbuster Author Michener Dies, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 17, 1997), https://
www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1997-oct-17-mn-43745-story.html [https://perma.cc/
V2HX-8AQP]. Michener decided he was sick of undergoing dialysis and publicly an-
nounced that he was discontinuing it. See Paul Galloway, Author James A. Michener, 90,
Dies After 50-Year Writing Saga, CHI. TRIBUNE (Oct. 17, 1997), https://
www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1997-10-17-9710170247-story.html [https://perma.cc/
3MUU-6SRH]. He died about two weeks later. See id. In all of the publicity around his
decision and death, no reporter or commentator anywhere in the United States character-
ized his decision to discontinue life-sustaining dialysis as suicide.
98. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 703 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S.
793, 801–02 (1997).
99. PAULINE JACOBS, FORCE-FEEDING OF PRISONERS AND DETAINEES ON HUNGER
STRIKE 3 (2012).
100. Stephanie Clavan Powell, Constitutional Law-Forced Feeding of a Prisoner on a
Hunger Strike: A Violation of an Inmates Right to Privacy, 61 N.C. L. REV. 715 (1983).
101. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 288–89 (1990) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting David Major, The Medical Procedures for Provid-
ing Food and Water: Indications and Effects, in BY NO EXTRAORDINARY MEANS: THE
CHOICE TO FORGO LIFE-SUSTAINING FOOD AND WATER 21, 25 (J. Lynn ed., 1986)).
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by the Due Process Clause must protect, if it protects anything, an
individual’s deeply personal decision to reject medical treatment, in-
cluding the artificial delivery of food and water.102
Chief Justice Rehnquist deals with force-feeding only tangentially and
in the context of the state’s interest in preserving life. In his words, “We
do not think a State is required to remain neutral in the face of an in-
formed and voluntary decision by a physically able adult to starve to
death.”103 Chief Justice Rehnquist adds: “Finally, we think a State may
properly decline to make judgments about the ‘quality’ of life that a par-
ticular individual may enjoy, and simply assert an unqualified interest in
the preservation of human life to be weighed against the constitutionally
protected interests of the individual.”104
Hunger strikes have a long history in American prisons but did not
gain widespread attention in the United States until after the September
11 attacks.105 Hunger strikes began almost immediately after at Guanta-
namo Bay Naval Base Prison, and they were widespread by 2005.106 To
break a 2005 hunger strike at Guantanamo, military officials imported
emergency “restraint chairs” to immobilize the prisoner so he could be
force fed via a nasogastric tube,107 as described by Justice O’Connor. The
prisoner can be strapped into the chair using eight-point restraints
(hands, feet, shoulders, head, and torso).108 The ethics of force-feeding
was at the center of a press conference about the U.S. Department of
Defense’s 2006 Instruction109 on treatment of prisoners at Guanta-
namo.110 The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Medical Affairs, William
Winkenwerder, equated hunger striking with suicide, saying, “There is a
moral question. . . . Do you allow a person to commit suicide? Or do you
take steps to protect their health and preserve their life?”111 The Depart-
ment of Defense has argued that it is following rules similar to those
adopted by the U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of Prisons for deal-
ing with hunger strikers, which have generally been endorsed by the
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 280 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
104. Id. at 282 (emphasis added).
105. George J. Annas, Hunger Strikes at Guantanamo: Medical Ethics and Human
Rights in a “Legal Black Hole”, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1377, 1377 (2006) [hereinafter
Annas, Hunger Strikes at Guantanamo].
106. Id.; Eric Schmitt & Tom Golden, Force-Feeding at Guantánamo Is Now Acknowl-
edged, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/22/world/middleeast/
forcefeeding-at-guantanamo-is-now-acknowledged.html [https://perma.cc/ZS3M-NPLW].
107. Annas, Hunger Strikes at Guantanamo, supra note 105, at 1377.
108. Len Rubenstein & George J. Annas, Medical Ethics at Guantanamo Bay Detention
Centre and in the US Military: A Time for Reform, 374 LANCET 353, 353 (2009).
109. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION 2310.08, MEDICAL PROGRAM SUPPORT FOR DE-
TAINEE OPERATIONS (2006).
110. William Winkenwerder, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, Media
Roundtable with Assistant Secretary Winkenwerder (June 7, 2006) (transcript available on
the U.S. Department of Defense website).
111. Tim Golden, Tough U.S. Steps in Hunger Strike at Camp in Cuba, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 9, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/09/politics/tough-us-steps-in-hunger-
strike-at-camp-in-cuba.html [https://perma.cc/V99S-B4VS].
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courts.112 This is only partially correct: the Bureau of Prisons mandates
that only a physician may administer force-feeding and that the physician
do so in accordance with good and accepted medical procedures.113 Phy-
sicians can order forced feeding in Department of Justice facilities only
when consistent with the Constitution.114 This means that the prison must
demonstrate a compelling state interest, sometimes described as a “legiti-
mate penological interest” (which have included preventing suicide and
maintaining order in the prison).115
It should be recalled that Chief Justice Rehnquist ignored physicians
altogether in his discussion of the right to die in Cruzan.116 On Cruzan’s
thirtieth anniversary, the most controversial force-feeding cases are hun-
ger strikes, and the physician’s role is no longer marginalized but central.
In this context, medical ethics becomes critical. In medical ethics, the po-
sition of the World Medical Association on the physician’s role in hunger
strike is the clearest and most authoritative: “Forced feeding is never ethi-
cally acceptable. Even if intended to benefit, feeding accompanied by
threats, coercion, force or use of physical restraints is a form of inhuman
and degrading treatment.”117
As in Cruzan, the claim that a treatment refusal can be a form of com-
mitting suicide is front and center. Nonetheless, as in Cruzan, suicide is a
red herring—the hunger striker is not trying to kill himself, he is trying to
get the prison administration to change their policies or to change the
conditions of his imprisonment.118 He has no desire to die but is willing to
risk death to improve the chances of changing the conditions of confine-
ment or even the chances of release.119
The constitutionality of force-feeding at Guantanamo did not get a full
hearing in a U.S. federal court until 2014.120 U.S. District Court Judge
Gladys Kessler was asked to prohibit the forced cell extraction followed
112. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REVIEW OF DEPARTMENT COMPLIANCE WITH PRESI-
DENT’S EXECUTIVE ORDER ON DETAINEE CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT 56 (2009); Ru-
benstein & Annas, supra note 108, at 353.
113. Rubenstein & Annas, supra note 108, at 353–54.
114. Id. at 354.
115. Washington v. Harper, 492 U.S. 210, 224–26 (1990).
116. See infra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
117. World Med. Ass’n, Declaration of Malta on Hunger Strikes para. 23, Nov. 1991,
rev. Oct. 2017, available at https://www.wma.net/policies-post/wma-declaration-of-malta-on
-hunger-strikers/ [https://perma.cc/HTT5-2XAS] [hereinafter 2017 Declaration of Malta].
“A hunger striker is a mentally competent person who has indicated that he has decided to
embark on a hunger strike and has refused to take food and/or fluids for a significant
interval.” World Med. Ass’n, Declaration of Malta on Hunger Strikes, Guidelines for the
Management of Hunger Strikers para. 1, Nov. 1991, rev. Sept. 1992, available at https://
www.legislationline.org/documents/id/8591 [https://perma.cc/DSU9-ZCQ5].
118. See Annas, Hunger Strikes at Guantanamo, supra note 105, at 1377–78.
119. See id. The only legitimate state interest is in the orderly running of the prison, and
this will be discussed later.
120. Dhiab v. Obama, 952 F. Supp. 2d 154, 154–55 (D.D.C. 2013); Charlie Savage, A
Practice Goes on Trial: Force-Feeding a Detainee, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2014), https://
www.nytimes.com/2014/10/07/us/a-practice-goes-on-trial-force-feeding-a-detainee.html
[https://perma.cc/FD9U-GMAS].
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by forced feeding in a restraint chair of Abu Wa’el Dhiab.121 Dhiab had
been a prisoner at Guantanamo for eleven years, was never charged with
a crime, and was cleared for release in 2009.122 Judge Kessler initially
ruled that all force-feeding must end (the first such order in the history of
Guantanamo and the only one to date).123 The case nonetheless was com-
plex. Dhiab was not opposed to voluntary enteral feeding at the hospital,
only to being involuntarily fed in a painful manner in the restraint
chair.124 The Department of Defense remarkably refused his request for
voluntary feeding.125 Judge Kessler described the Department of De-
fense’s refusal as presenting her with an anguishing Hobson’s choice: to
“reissue another Temporary Restraining Order . . . despite the very real
probability that Mr. Dhiab will die . . . [or] allow the medical personnel
on the scene to take the medical actions to keep Mr. Dhiab alive, but at
the possible cost of great pain and suffering.”126 She decided to permit
the physicians at Guantanamo to resume force-feeding because she did
not believe she had the legal authority to prohibit it.127
The cruelty of this method of force-feeding would be apparent to any-
one seeing the videotapes of Dhiab’s force-feeding. Judge Kessler or-
dered these videotapes made public, but ultimately, an appeals court
ruled that the Department of Defense need not release them because
they could be used in terrorist “propaganda and in carrying out attacks
on Americans.”128 Before Judge Kessler could hold a follow-up hearing
on Dhiab’s treatment, Dhiab, a Syrian, was released to Uruguay, a coun-
try he had no connection with, and his current whereabouts are
unknown.129
121. Dhiab, 952 F. Supp 2d at 154–55. Forced cell extraction is a method of violently
removing the prisoner from his cell using guards in riot gear. See Cell Extractions, HUM.
RTS. WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/us1006/2.htm [https://perma.cc/Y6B2-
2PM2] (last visited Jan. 14, 2020).
122. Dhiab, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 154–55.
123. Charlie Savage, Guantánamo Inmate’s Case Reignites Fight Over Detentions, N.Y.
TIMES (May 23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/24/us/judge-allows-military-to-
force-feed-guantanamo-detainee.html [https://perma.cc/93LH-96K5].
124. Dhiab v. Obama, No. 05-1457 (GK), 2014 WL 2134491, at *1 (D.D.C. May 22,
2014).
125. Id.
126. Id.; Josh Gernstein, Judge Lets Guantanamo Inmate’s Force-Feeding Resume, PO-
LITICO (May 23, 2014, 8:39 AM), https://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2014/05/
judge-lets-guantanamo-inmates-force-feeding-resume-189099 [https://perma.cc/Y3RT-
6NU4].
127. The appeals court later ruled that she did have the authority to prohibit force-
feeding. Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Charlie Savage, Appeals
Court Allows Challenges by Detainees at Guantánamo Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/12/us/appeals-court-clears-way-for-guantanamo-chal-
lenges.html [https://perma.cc/F7VK-RE2N].
128. Dhiab v. Trump, 852 F.3d 1087, 1089, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Charlie Savage,
Videos of Force-Feeding at Guantánamo Will Stay Secret, Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/us/politics/guantanamo-detainees-force-
feeding-videos.html [https://perma.cc/GL2E-R765].
129. David Kimbal-Stanley, Force Feeding Videos Remain Sealed, LAWFARE (Apr. 3,
2017, 1:14 PM), www.lawfareblog.com/force-feeding-videos-remain-sealed [https://
perma.cc/3CLZ-62XJ].
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The context of the War on Terror and Guantanamo is hardly conducive
to a dispassionate view of the interests of the state in force-feeding a ter-
rorist suspect hunger striker. Nonetheless, the anniversary of Cruzan pro-
vides us with an opportunity to at least recognize that the prevention of
suicide is not a legitimate rationale for force-feeding, just as it is not a
legitimate reason to prevent a patient from refusing life-sustaining treat-
ment. This leaves orderly prison administration as the only potential com-
pelling state interest to justify force-feeding a competent hunger striker.
Historically, courts, including the Supreme Court, have granted prison
officials wide latitude in making management-justified prison policies, in-
cluding using routine invasive, mandatory strip searches.130
Since prisons can almost always accommodate hunger strikers (e.g., by
moving them to a separate wing of the prison or isolating them from the
general population), if prisons were required to present actual evidence
of prison disruption (the type of clear and convincing evidence that the
Cruzan court required of Cruzan’s family), force-feeding competent pris-
oners would seldom, if ever, be constitutionally justified. Alternatively,
courts could (and should) simply label force-feeding of restrained compe-
tent prisoners as cruel and unusual punishment and a violation of the
Eighth Amendment. And, of course, if overseen by a physician, an une-
quivocal violation of internationally recognized medical ethics.
VI. CONCLUSION
The passage of decades gives us a new perspective on events, and it can
help us learn lessons from juxtaposing events that had never seemed re-
lated but actually are. Cruzan, a case that Nancy Cruzan’s parents lost,
for example, paradoxically fortified the right to refuse treatment and re-
moved any doubt that it applied to all life-sustaining medical interven-
tions, including fluids and nutrition, and was never rightly classified as
suicide. Nor is a terminal diagnosis required to exercise this right. There
is also a third woman, Terri Schiavo, and her case, which included more
than two dozen judges, Congress, and the President, underlined how solid
the right to refuse treatment is after Cruzan.131
Remaining battles on the “right to die” front continue to be fought on
the state level over statutes that provide physicians with legal immunity
for participation in physician-assisted suicide. These battles in the state
legislatures and in state ballot initiatives are personified in a fourth wo-
man, Brittany Maynard.132 The legal system has been supportive of the
130. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 322 (2012); see
George J. Annas, Strip Searches in the Supreme Court—Prisons and Public Health, 367
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1653, 1654 (2012).
131. LOIS SHEPHERD, IF THAT EVER HAPPENS TO ME: MAKING LIFE AND DEATH DE-
CISIONS AFTER TERRI SCHIAVO 1–2 (2009); George J. Annas, “Culture of Life” Politics and
the Case of Terri Schiavo, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1710, 1710 (2005).
132. Brittany Maynard, My Right to Death with Dignity at 29, CNN (Nov. 2, 2014, 10:44
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/07/opinion/maynard-assisted-suicide-cancer-dignity/in-
dex.html [https://perma.cc/C4TC-TBTD].
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rights of young women with serious medical conditions as the progeny of
Cruzan, but not the Cruzan case itself, well illustrate. Litigation has, how-
ever, provided little support for the human rights of hunger strikers or for
prisoners in general. This problem could, somewhat ironically, be ad-
dressed by providing physicians with more authority over treatment deci-
sions in prisons. This would move the decision-making to the doctor-
patient arena, where force-feeding of competent hunger strikers is simply
not permitted by medical ethics.133
Apollo 11 did not lead to a Mars landing or even to further manned
exploration of space. The major lethal tragedies in the space program—
the incineration of three astronauts in an Apollo capsule134 and the ex-
plosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger135—did, however, help lead to
the adoption of a culture of safety in other industries. The U.S. health
care industry has yet to adopt a culture of safety, as spectacularly illus-
trated by its negligent, lethal treatment of the first man on the moon and
its attempt to cover-up its ineptitude. The “moon shot” is now linked to
the National Cancer Institute and its government funded attempts to de-
velop a cure for cancer, research widely endorsed by our politicians as
nonpartisan and popular, while patient safety remains marginalized.
Physics has been displaced as our planet’s leading science in our quest
for “progress.” The emphasis is now on biological advances, most notably
in the genetics realm. This means space engineering has given way to ge-
netic engineering, and the “right to die” slogan has been displaced by a
competing slogan, the “right to try.”136 We have also begun a global de-
bate about whether to strive for immortality by modifying our bodies or
by redesigning them in ways that will make them suitable for interplane-
tary travel. We now spend much more energy trying to design a “better
human” rather than working on how to control, or even influence, cli-
mate change.
The compelling photos of Earth from space have not been powerful
enough to incite global action to save our fragile planet. Commercial in-
terests continue to overwhelm environmental interests, just as national-
security interests continue to overwhelm the promotion of basic human
rights. Likewise, the race to the moon between the United States and the
former Soviet Union has morphed. It is now a scientific struggle between
the United States and China to capture and sustain leadership in the
fields of genetic engineering and artificial intelligence.
133. See 2017 Declaration of Malta, supra note 117, at para. 3.
134. Jan. 27, 1967: 3 Astronauts Die in Capsule Fire, WIRED (Jan. 26, 2009, 9:00 PM),
https://www.wired.com/2009/01/jan-27-1967-3-astronauts-die-in-capsule-fire-2/ [https://
perma.cc/P48Y-C2YB].
135. Michael Hirsley, Space Shuttle Explodes, CHI. TRIBUNE (Jan. 28, 1986), https://
www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1986-01-29-8601080078-story.html [https://perma.cc/
R8DB-FMA6].
136. Julie Jacob, Questions of Safety and Fairness Raised as Right-to-Try Movement
Gains Steam, 314 JAMA 758, 758 (2015).
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Both Cruzan and Apollo 11 suggest that we humans cannot predict the
future—but our present day human rights and scientific endeavors sug-
gest that the coming three decades could be crucial ones in determining
both how we die and what kind of a planet we will inhabit. There is,
unfortunately, nothing in our past three decades to suggest we will seri-
ously deal with death in our health care nonsystem. More likely, we will
continue to deny it and counterproductively concentrate on using our
technology to try to increase our length of life even at the expense of our
quality of life. In continuing to pursue life extension we may paradoxi-
cally make the case for physician-assisted suicide much more compelling
than it is now.
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